Russia is stepping up its use of ballistic missiles, whilst Ukraine is facing an acute shortage of Patriot interceptors. Under such circumstances, a purely defensive approach \u2014 waiting for a launch and attempting to shoot down every missile \u2014 becomes economically and physically unsustainable. The solution lies in combining missile defence with the systematic destruction of launchers, depots, command and support infrastructure before the missiles are even launched. ATACMS, long-range Ukrainian assets, aviation and reconnaissance could all form part of such a system, but none of them alone will solve the problem.<\/p>\n
Briefly about the main points<\/strong><\/p>\n The main problem with Russian ballistics is not just the speed of the missile itself. Systems such as \u00abThe \u00bbIskander-M\u2019 are mobile<\/strong>, can change position rapidly and have a range of up to approximately 500 km. The fact that the launch sites are located closer to the Ukrainian border further reduces the time between launch and impact.<\/p>\n Patriot with missiles PAC-3<\/a> It remains Ukraine\u2019s primary means of combating high-speed ballistic targets. The Ukrainian Ministry of Defence has explicitly described the PAC-3 as the most effective weapon against Russian ballistic missiles.<\/p>\n But resources are limited. According to Volodymyr Zelenskyy, in 2026, deliveries of interceptor missiles to Ukraine fell to roughly a third of the 2025 level. Kyiv estimates Russia\u2019s capabilities at up to 100 ballistic missile launches per month<\/strong>, whilst production in the Russian Federation continues to rise.<\/p>\n This creates a disadvantageous model of warfare: Russia can mass-produce missiles and force Ukraine to use up its scarce and expensive interceptors.<\/p>\n The strategy should therefore consist of two parts. The first is \u2014 \u00abto the right of the start\u00bb<\/strong>: to detect the missile, warn the public and intercept it. The second is \u2014 \u00abto the left of the launch\u00bb<\/strong>: to ensure that some of the Russian missiles cannot be launched at all.<\/p>\n The launch of the \u00abIskander\u00bb involves more than just one vehicle. For sustained combat operations, launchers, transport and loading vehicles, missiles, maintenance, communications, command, reconnaissance and logistics are all required.<\/p>\n That is precisely why shooting down a single missile in the air only solves the problem for a few minutes. Disabling components of the ground-based system can reduce the likelihood of subsequent launches.<\/p>\n Ukraine is already moving in this direction. Zelenskyy reported the destruction of a Russian \u00abIskander\u00bb launcher near the border, whilst Ukrainian forces are increasingly targeting Russian air defence systems, radars, logistics and other targets deep behind enemy lines. Reuters noted that Ukrainian medium-range strikes are already forcing Russia to redeploy its air defence assets and are complicating its logistics.<\/p>\n This is essential for countering ballistic threats: The closer Russia moves its launch site to the Ukrainian border, the shorter the missile\u2019s flight time becomes; however, this also brings the launch site itself closer to Ukrainian weapons systems.<\/strong><\/p>\n The speed of reconnaissance becomes a decisive factor.<\/p>\n ATACMS are, in theory, well suited to targeting key military installations deep behind enemy lines. Their advantage lies in their high approach speed and accuracy, which reduces the time a mobile target has to leave the area.<\/p>\n But the problem with the start-up \u00abIskander<\/a>\u00bb\u2026 lies precisely in its mobility. If the coordinates are received too late, even a highly accurate missile may strike a location where the installation is no longer present.\".<\/p>\n Therefore ATACMS only make sense as the final component of a much larger reconnaissance and strike system<\/strong>. Targets that are unable to move quickly \u2013 such as logistical assets, repair facilities, ammunition depots or command centres \u2013 may be far more advantageous, provided they can be reliably identified.<\/p>\n There is another problem \u2014 the number of missiles themselves. American ATACMS stocks<\/a> and other long-range, high-precision missiles have been significantly reduced due to the US war with Iran. This limits the scope for large-scale new deliveries to Ukraine.<\/p>\n It would therefore be irrational to use the scarce ATACMS on every potential target. It should be reserved for targets of high military value.<\/p>\n The use of aircraft follows a different logic.<\/p>\n Any attempt to use fighter jets as permanent \u00abhunters\u00bb of mobile \u00abIskander\u00bb missiles deep within Russian territory would be extremely risky due to Russia\u2019s multi-layered air defence system.<\/p>\n A much more realistic role for combat aviation is \u2014 a platform for deploying weapons from a safer distance<\/strong>.<\/p>\n Ukraine is already using Western air-launched cruise missiles, and in 2026 the UK and France agreed to expand Ukraine\u2019s capabilities in the production of the Storm Shadow\/SCALP<\/a>.<\/p>\n Such weapons could increase the pressure on the fixed infrastructure that supports the operations of missile units.<\/p>\n In other words, the role of the air force is not necessarily to track down a specific launch site. It is far more important to restrict the operational freedom of the enemy\u2019s entire missile system<\/strong>.<\/p>\n Sabotage and reconnaissance units could, in theory, be useful for gathering information on military installations or carrying out specific special operations.<\/p>\n However, it would be a mistake to make the DRG the main tool in the fight against Russian ballistic missiles.<\/p>\n Firstly, operations of this kind are extremely risky. Secondly, it is practically impossible to scale them up to involve dozens of mobile missile systems. Thirdly, Russia can constantly change the locations where they are deployed.<\/p>\n Therefore, special units may be a component of the system<\/strong>, but not its foundation. Technical reconnaissance, unmanned aerial vehicles, satellite data and long-range, high-precision weapons must carry out the systemic task.<\/p>\n In fact, the main weapon against mobile ballistic missiles is neither the ATACMS nor the Patriot, but speed of information<\/strong>.<\/p>\n We need the shortest possible cycle:<\/p>\n detection \u2192 confirmation \u2192 transmission of coordinates \u2192 decision \u2192 engagement \u2192 assessment of the result.<\/strong><\/p>\n If this process takes hours, the mobile launcher will almost certainly have moved on by then.<\/p>\n That is precisely why satellite reconnaissance by partners, unmanned aerial reconnaissance, electronic intelligence capabilities, automated intelligence fusion and continuous surveillance of Russian missile units are of critical importance to Ukraine.<\/p>\n This is one of the reasons why long-range Ukrainian drones have become so important: they can be produced in much larger batches than expensive ballistic or cruise missiles, and used to exert sustained pressure on Russian military infrastructure. In August, President Zelenskyy stated that Ukraine would be expanding its deep-strike programme and is already capable of striking targets at ranges of over 2,500 km.<\/p>\n When there is a shortage of interceptors, another need arises \u2014 stricter prioritisation of air defence<\/strong>.<\/p>\n\n
Why Patriot is no longer enough<\/h2>\n
The main target is not the missile, but the system that launches it<\/h2>\n
ATACMS: a powerful tool, but not a \u00abmagic button\u00bb<\/h2>\n
Can aviation help?<\/h2>\n
DRG: a very limited tool<\/h2>\n
The most important thing is to find the trigger to get started<\/h2>\n
Patriot needs to be spent differently<\/h2>\n