There may still be several Russian relay stations in Kyiv, which establish a short-term communication channel for the remote control of attack drones and for adjusting their flight path directly during an attack. This was stated by Serhiy Beskrestnov, a freelance adviser to the President of Ukraine on the development of defence technologies, who goes by the call sign \u00abFlash\u00bb. In his estimation, there are not many such devices in the capital \u2014 perhaps between one and three \u2014 but their presence significantly complicates efforts to establish comprehensive protection for the city using electronic warfare measures.<\/p>\n
According to Sergey Beskrestnov<\/strong>, this does not refer to a large fixed network, but to a limited number of devices that can be switched on for a short time specifically during a Russian attack. Such a repeater makes it possible to maintain contact with a drone once it is in the vicinity of the target and to adjust its route.<\/p>\n \u00abNot many. Perhaps 1\u20133. As long as they remain, sealing off the city using electronic warfare measures will not be effective,\u00bb said Beskrestnov.<\/p><\/blockquote>\n At the same time, the figure of 1\u20133 devices is an estimate provided by the presidential adviser himself. Neither the SBU, the Air Force nor any other security agencies have publicly confirmed either the exact number of such repeaters in the capital or their possible locations.<\/p>\n The standard \u00abShahed\u00bb attack drone can cover a significant portion of its route autonomously, following pre-programmed coordinates. However, new variants of Russian drones are now capable of maintaining two-way communication and transmitting data whilst in flight.<\/p>\n Beskrestnov had previously explained that Russia is using Mesh networks<\/strong> \u2014 a system in which several nodes can transmit signals to one another. This architecture enables the operator to receive information from the drone and, in certain cases, to correct its flight path in real time. In September, a presidential adviser stated that Ukraine was already facing \u00abShahed\u00bb drones controlled via a mesh network.<\/p>\n It is the local repeater that can act as the final link in such a communication chain. Its role is to provide a signal over a relatively short distance when the drone is already near the target.<\/p>\n On 4 September, following a Russian drone strike<\/a> At the SBU building in central Kyiv, Beskrestnov had already put forward the theory that a local repeater had been used.<\/p>\n He then suggested that the \u00abShahed\u00bb might have been controlled online via a Mesh repeater with internet access, which a Russian agent had switched on nearby just for the duration of the attack. According to him, the device could have been compact and operated within a radius of several kilometres. This was specifically Beskrestnov\u2019s expert assessment, rather than the published conclusion of an official investigation.<\/p>\n He later clarified that the drone which attacked the SBU building was a \u00abGeran-4\u00bb jet drone and was heading for Kyiv from the occupied part of Donetsk Oblast.<\/p>\n The Russian scheme is not limited to ground-based equipment. On 28 September, Beskrestnov reported on another scenario during the attack on Kyiv\u2019s business centre<\/a> \u00abInkom\u00bb.<\/p>\n According to him, a single Russian aircraft carried out the strike, whilst the \u00abShahed\u00bb drone was flying higher and was being used as aerial radio signal repeater<\/strong>, whilst simultaneously transmitting video footage of the impact area.<\/p>\n This indicates a shift in the tactics of Russian attacks: drones can be used not only as disposable weapons, but also as components of a reconnaissance and communications network.<\/p>\n Electronic warfare systems can jam satellite navigation or specific drone control channels. However, the system becomes more complex if the enemy changes frequencies, uses multiple communication nodes or activates a local repeater for only a short period of time.<\/p>\n Back in September, Beskrestnov stated that Kyiv was not adequately protected by systems specifically designed to counter mesh-based navigation. In his view, the problem requires specific technical solutions, rather than simply traditional navigation jamming.<\/p>\n At the same time, Ukraine is deploying aircraft and ground-based air defence systems against the \u00abShahed\u00bb drones, interceptor drones<\/a> and electronic warfare. However, each of these methods has its own limitations, particularly when it comes to high-speed aircraft with an online control link.<\/p>\n The issue of Russian relay stations is not a new one. In the first half of 2026, Ukraine reported the presence of equipment on Belarusian territory that Russia could use to control attack drones.<\/p>\nWhy does Russia need relay stations in or near Kyiv?<\/h2>\n
A similar scheme was suspected following the attack on the SBU building<\/h2>\n
\u00abShaheeds\u00bb have already been used as aerial repeaters<\/h2>\n
Why a standard \u00abelectronic warfare dome\u00bb is not enough<\/h2>\n
The threat posed by relay stations has already arisen outside Kyiv<\/h2>\n