Briefly about the main points<\/strong><\/p>\n Early October saw an event unfold on the Ukrainian foreign exchange market that would have seemed extraordinary just a few years ago. The official exchange rate for the US dollar crossed the threshold for the first time 45 hryvnias<\/strong>. On 6 October, the National Bank of Ukraine set it at 45.0564 UAH per dollar, whilst on the previous working day it stood at 44.9857 UAH. By way of comparison, a year earlier the US dollar was worth around 41.2 UAH. Thus, over the course of the year, the hryvnia has lost significant ground against the dollar, although the devaluation process itself was uneven and accompanied by periods of stabilisation.<\/p>\n However, it is important to understand the difference between the all-time high in the exchange rate and the start of the currency crisis. By 7 October, the official dollar rate had already fallen back below the psychological threshold \u2014 to 44.9453 UAH. As of 9 October NBU<\/a> set the exchange rate at 44.85 UAH to the dollar, whilst the average cash selling rate at bureaux stood at around 45.05 UAH. The market has shown that even after setting a new record, the US currency can still fall in value. This does not negate the long-term pressure on the hryvnia, but it does refute the notion that crossing the 45 UAH mark automatically triggers an uncontrolled rise in the exchange rate.<\/p>\n The NBU\u2019s official dollar exchange rate, UAH\/$<\/strong><\/p>\n The record, however, came as no surprise to market participants. According to analysis<\/a> According to Forbes Ukraine, the dollar had been approaching the 45 UAH mark since the start of the summer, and the regulator had to actively resort to foreign exchange interventions to curb sharp fluctuations. Ukraine operates under a managed floating exchange rate regime: the value of the hryvnia is determined by supply and demand on the interbank market, but the National Bank regularly sells foreign currency from its reserves when the needs of importers and other buyers exceed the inflows from exporters.<\/p>\n In peacetime, the exchange rate would have depended to a large extent on the competitiveness of Ukrainian enterprises, international trade and the flow of private capital. During a full-scale war, these factors have been compounded by large-scale military procurement, the destruction of production facilities, disruptions to logistics and the dependence of public finances on support from partners. Therefore, the key question now is not whether the dollar might briefly exceed 45 hryvnias, but rather how resilient the mechanism that supplies the economy with foreign currency remains.<\/p>\n One of the most significant factors putting pressure on the hryvnia is the huge disparity between the value of goods Ukraine purchases from abroad and the value of goods it sells to other countries. According to the State Customs Service, between January and August 2026, Ukraine imported goods worth approximately $66.3 billion, whilst exports amounted to only around $26.7 billion. Calculated on the basis of detailed statistics, the trade deficit reached $39.55 billion. In other words, for every 100 dollars spent on imports of goods, there were only around 40 dollars in revenue from exports of goods.<\/p>\n Foreign trade in goods, January\u2013August 2026<\/strong><\/p>\n This imbalance does not mean that the Ukrainian foreign exchange market is short of exactly the same amount of dollars every day. Trade in goods is only one part of the country\u2019s balance of payments. Foreign exchange inflows are also influenced by international financial assistance, private remittances, capital transactions and other payments. However, such a significant surplus of imports over exports creates a fundamental problem: Ukrainian enterprises regularly require foreign currency to pay for purchases, whilst the economy\u2019s own export earnings do not cover these needs.<\/p>\n The structure of imports explains why it is not possible to close this gap quickly. Over eight months, Ukraine imported machinery, equipment and vehicles worth over $29.9 billion, fuel and energy products worth more than $9.5 billion, and chemical industry products worth a further $9 billion. A significant proportion of these purchases is essential for the operation of industry, transport, the energy sector and the defence sector. Imposing mechanical restrictions on such imports could temporarily reduce demand for foreign currency, but at the same time cause further damage to an economy already operating under the strain of war-related losses.<\/p>\n The situation was made considerably more difficult by the resumption of the de facto Russian blockade of Ukrainian Black Sea ports<\/a> in the summer of 2026. Maritime logistics are of fundamental importance to Ukrainian exports, particularly for the agricultural sector, the metallurgical industry and businesses that transport large consignments of raw materials. Exporting such goods via alternative routes is often more expensive, takes longer and is constrained by the capacity of railways and road crossings. As a result, even a company that has maintained its production capacity and has a foreign buyer may face difficulties in physically shipping its products.<\/p>\n In early October, the situation in the Black Sea remained dangerous. On 3 October, Russian forces attacked a Liberian-flagged cargo ship in one of the ports in the Odesa region. One person was killed and three others were injured. Reuters reported that the renewed Russian blockade had seriously disrupted trade routes and reduced opportunities for the export of grain and steel. At the same time, it would be incorrect to speak of a complete absence of any maritime exports: the reality is one of significant restrictions, risks to shipping and a reduction in available transport capacity.<\/p>\n For the foreign exchange market, it is not only the number of ships dispatched that matters. An exporter receives foreign currency once the terms of the trade contract have been fulfilled, and disruptions to the logistics chain can delay these inflows. Additional costs for insurance, transport and transhipment of goods also reduce the economic attractiveness of exports. If a Ukrainian manufacturer sells fewer products or receives a lower net income from them, their ability to supply the market with foreign currency is reduced.<\/p>\n Consequently, Russian attacks on ports and shipping affect more than just individual businesses. They undermine one of the main mechanisms through which the Ukrainian economy obtains foreign currency without resorting to external loans and grants.<\/p>\n Another blow to foreign exchange earnings was the crisis in the steel industry<\/a>. Before the full-scale war, the Ukrainian steel industry was a key source of exports, foreign exchange earnings and jobs. Now, companies are simultaneously facing the destruction of production facilities, an unstable electricity supply, high production costs and difficulties in accessing foreign markets. Added to this are regulatory restrictions in the European market, in particular steel import quotas and the requirements of the Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism (CBAM).<\/p>\n\n
The dollar at 45 hryvnias: what this new all-time high means<\/h2>\n
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<\/a>Trade deficit of nearly $40 billion: the main problem facing the foreign exchange market<\/h2>\n
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<\/a>Naval blockade: how Russia is reducing Ukraine\u2019s foreign exchange earnings<\/h2>\n
Metallurgical giants grind to a halt: Ukraine loses export revenue<\/h2>\n